SBIR-STTR Award

FPGA Vulnerability Analysis Tools
Award last edited on: 3/26/2021

Sponsored Program
STTR
Awarding Agency
DOD : Navy
Total Award Amount
$1,149,855
Award Phase
2
Solicitation Topic Code
N19A-T018
Principal Investigator
Jason Dickens

Company Information

GrammaTech Inc

531 Esty Street
Ithaca, NY 14850
   (607) 273-7340
   info@grammatech.com
   www.grammatech.com

Research Institution

University of Notre Dame

Phase I

Contract Number: N68335-19-C-0307
Start Date: 6/3/2019    Completed: 12/9/2019
Phase I year
2019
Phase I Amount
$140,000
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are becoming increasingly critical components in advanced electronic systems. However, limited research has been applied to identifying critical vulnerabilities that could be present in the designs deployed on these FPGAs. The risk is further increased by the use of 3rd party intellectual property in many designs.GrammaTech is proposing to develop a Trust verification framework to verify the trustworthiness of FPGA designs. Our solution will operate on the actual configuration bits of the FPGA to verify the design as deployed. Our approach will operate with limited prior design knowledge to physically locate and report on potential vulnerabilities and/or hardware Trojans in the FPGA design. It will also be flexible enough to support a top-down design verification methodology and expansion through additional analyses including formal verification methods. Our detection algorithms will be equally applicable for Trust verification of digital ASIC designs. GrammaTech is actively working to complement its leadership software vulnerability analysis tools with an equally robust tool-suite for hardware vulnerability analysis and enable unified reporting of system vulnerability analyses.

Phase II

Contract Number: N68335-20-C-0569
Start Date: 7/30/2020    Completed: 7/29/2022
Phase II year
2020
Phase II Amount
$1,009,855
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are becoming increasingly critical components in advanced electronic systems. However, limited research has been applied to identifying critical vulnerabilities that could be present in the designs deployed on these FPGAs. The risk is further increased by the use of 3rd party intellectual property in many designs. GrammaTech is proposing to develop a Trust verification framework to verify the trustworthiness of FPGA designs. Our solution will operate on the actual configuration bits of the FPGA to verify the design as deployed. Our approach will operate with limited prior design knowledge to physically locate and report on potential vulnerabilities and/or hardware Trojans in the FPGA design. It will also be flexible enough to support a top-down design verification methodology and expansion through additional analyses including formal verification methods. Our detection algorithms will be equally applicable for Trust verification of digital ASIC designs. GrammaTech is actively working to complement its leadership software vulnerability analysis tools with an equally robust tool-suite for hardware vulnerability analysis and enable unified reporting of system vulnerability analyses.